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Previewssomewhat surprising in the task used by
Nicolle et al., because the respective vari-
ables they represent are, at least superfi-
cially, irrelevant to the choice at hand.
One possibility is that the representation
of the valuations according to the alterna-
tive preference set in dmPFC corre-
sponds to their storage in a temporary
buffer. In the event of a change of decision
context, those signals can be immediately
transferred into vmPFC, permitting rapid
deployment of the now behaviorally rele-
vant preference set. Another possibility
is that (although not applicable in the
specific task used by Nicolle et al.,
2012), the representation of the alterna-
tive valuations in dmPFC may allow for
the ongoing updating of those model-
based value signals on the basis of new
information about the sensory environ-
ment as it is received.
The study byNicolle et al. invites several
important directions for further research
going forward. First of all, if ‘‘other’’ versus
‘‘self’’ is not the relevant dimension for
differentiating ventromedial versus ante-
rior dorsomedial prefrontal function, but
instead the distinction is between the
choice relevance of alternative state-
space models, one might expect a similar944 Neuron 75, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Epatternof results in a task involving switch-
ing between two state-space models,
even in a completely nonsocial context.
Second, if it is the case that the dmPFC
is acting as a buffer to store alternative
models of the decision problem at hand
to enable rapid transferring of choice-rele-
vant models into vmPFC, what happens
in the dmPFC if more than two such
frameworks are to be used for a given
task, such as, for example, if participants
had to make choices on behalf of two
other people as well as themselves?
Regardless of the outcome of such future
research, the study by Nicolle et al.
illustrates how, through the use of quanti-
tative computational approaches married
to dynamic measurements of brain func-
tion, it is possible to gain insight into the
specific computational functions of brain
regions involved in even themost complex
social-cognitive processes.REFERENCES
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In this issue ofNeuron, Guerin et al. (2012) provide novel evidence that distinct parietal mechanisms for atten-
tion and memory compete when past experiences are compared to current perceptual input. While dorsal
parietal cortex supports attention to perceptual stimuli, high attentional demands suppress ventral parietal
regions important for veridical remembering.When walking down a street, sitting in
a restaurant, or boarding a plane, we
often find our attention captured by a
person that looks like someone we
know. We find ourselves wondering: do
I know this person? In these situations,we focus on perceptual features of this
candidate acquaintance and compare
these perceived features to our internal
representation (memory) of the neighbor,
colleague, or relation that they resemble.
Through this process we may determinethat this person is not a person we know
(in which case we would likely opt to not
wave or say hello) or that this person is
someone we know (in which case we
may still find ourselves debating whether
the situation permits a wave or hello).
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm and Results from Guerin et al., 2012
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PreviewsThis common experience illustrates two
important ways in which memory and
attention interact: (1) our memories of
the past can powerfully direct how
attention is allocated in the present and
(2) comparing our perceptions to the
contents of memory is often an attention-
ally demanding process. It is commonly
acknowledged that memory and attention
interact (Chun and Johnson, 2011), but
they have historically been studied in
isolation.
A particularly interesting facet of
the interaction between attention and
memory is that the product of these
interactions may ultimately be a memory
error. The most common cases are
when we are inattentive during the
encoding of an event (e.g., absentmind-
edly setting down our keys and failing to
recall their location later). However, atten-
tion and memory interactions may also
explain errors during retrieval. Returning
to the initial example: when seeing
a familiar-looking person, we may errone-
ously deem this person an acquaintance
because we fail to bring to mind a high-
fidelity memory of the known person
and/or we fail to properly compare that
memory to our current perception. When
errors of this type occur—saying hello to
a stranger that resembles a colleague—are they caused by lapses of memory,
attention, or a failed interaction between
the two?
Understanding the interaction between
memory and attention should involve
consideration of the common versus
distinct neural systems that contribute to
each. While episodic memory (our explicit
memories of past events or episodes)
critically depends on structures in the
medial temporal lobes, including the hip-
pocampus (Eichenbaum, 2004), there is
now abundant evidence from human
neuroimaging indicating that activity in
lateral parietal cortex tracks successful
retrieval of episodic memories (Wagner
et al., 2005). This observation is particu-
larly intriguing because of the known role
of lateral parietal cortex in visuospatial
attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000), which
has led researchers to propose that ori-
enting to external perceptual stimuli and
internally generated memories may in-
volve a common form of attention (Ca-
beza et al., 2008).
In this issue of Neuron, Guerin et al.
(2012) consider how memory and atten-
tion interact during attention-demanding
acts of memory retrieval. Using an ele-
gant experimental paradigm, the authors
separately manipulated the propensityNeuron 75, Sefor false memories to occur and the
attentional demands of memory retrieval.
This unique approach allowed for direct
comparison of the neural systems that
tracked the veridicality of memory and
those that supported the top-down allo-
cation of attention. Does top-down allo-
cation of attention to perceptual input
positively relate to memory veridicality?
Are there tradeoffs between attention
and memory?
In the experiment, human subjects first
studied a series of pictures of objects
(e.g., a bell; see Figure 1). Subjects then
completed a recognition test that oc-
curred during fMRI scanning. In the
recognition test, subjects were presented
with three pictures on each trial and were
instructed to choose which of the pictures
was previously studied or whether none
had been previously studied (see Fig-
ure 1). Each picture fell into one of three
types: (1) a previously studied picture—
target, (2) a new picture, unrelated to
previously studied pictures—novel, or (3)
a new picture from the same semantic
category as a previously studied pic-
ture—related (e.g., another picture of
a bell). Critically, all trials in the recognition
test contained two pictures from a com-
mon semantic category (e.g., two bells)
along with a third picture from a distinct
category (e.g., cat). What varied across
trials was whether a target was present
or absent (a memory manipulation) and
whether there were one or two pictures
that were reasonable target candidates
(an attention manipulation). Specifically,
on some trials, the two pictures from the
same semantic category were novel
(e.g., two novel cats) and the third picture
(from a distinct category) was a target
(e.g., thepreviously studiedbell). This situ-
ation required low attention because two
of the pictures (the cats) could easily be
rejected. On other trials, however, the
two pictures from the same category
included one target and one related
picture (e.g., the previously studied bell
and a new bell). This situation required
greater attention because two of the pic-
tures (the bells) were reasonable candi-
dates. Additionally, there were also cases
when the target was absent, with attention
varied for these trials, as well. Namely,
in some cases there were two novel
items from a common category (e.g., two
cats) and one related item (e.g., a newptember 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 945
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Previewsbell)—a situation requiring low attention
because two pictures (the cats) could be
easily rejected. In other cases, one novel
picture (e.g., a cat) was presented along
with two related items from a common
category (e.g., two new bells), which
required high attention because two
pictures were reasonable candidates.
Thus, target presence/absence was
crossed with the attentional demands.
Behavioral analysis of subjects’ per-
formance confirmed that the memory
manipulation was effective, with subjects
generally successful at recognizing tar-
gets but also prone to memory errors in
certain situations. Specifically, subjects
were highly successful (76% accuracy)
at identifying the target picture when it
was paired with two novel items from
a category distinct from the target. When
the target was paired with a related item,
subjects were still usually able to identify
the target (65%) and rarely selected
the related item (10%), indicating that
subjects retained enough perceptual
information about the target in memory
to discriminate it from a very similar
picture. Interestingly, however, when two
related items (from a common category)
were presented (target absent), subjects
falsely ‘‘recognized’’ one of these pictures
very frequently (47%), even though they
were explicitly warned about the pres-
ence of highly similar, but new pictures.
Even when a single related item was pre-
sented (alongside two novel items), it was
also falsely recognized quite often (38%).
Thus, when the target was not percep-
tually available, subjects frequently
falsely remembered pictures based on a
gist memory. When the target was per-
ceptually available, however, these gist-
based false memories were suppressed
in favor of true memories of the target. It
is the comparison of true memories in
the target present conditions versus false
memories in the target absent conditions
that is of central interest.
The manipulation of attention was
strongly validated by eye tracking data
that were simultaneously collected during
fMRI scanning. These data revealed
that subjects initiated more saccades
between the two pictures from the same
category (e.g., the two bells) in the high
attention conditions than the low attention
conditions—that is, when these pictures
consisted of a target and a related picture946 Neuron 75, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Eor two related pictures. It should be
emphasized that this attention manipula-
tion was based purely on memory. All trial
types were perceptually equivalent, con-
taining two semantically similar items
and one unique item, meaning that
attention was not always allocated to
the pictures from a common category.
Rather, attention was preferentially allo-
cated to the pictures from a common
categorywhen they overlappedwith infor-
mation stored in memory.
Turning to the fMRI data, Guerin and
colleagues found striking and largely
dissociable effects of attention and
memory. The effect of attention was
evident in dorsal frontoparietal cortex,
including the intraparietal sulcus (IPS),
with this network exhibiting greater acti-
vation when attention demands were
high. This finding is consistent with more
traditional studies of top-down visuospa-
tial attention (Corbetta and Shulman,
2002). Notably, by simultaneously record-
ing eye movements, the authors were
able to confirm that these dorsal parietal
responses were not simply attributable
to eye movements. Rather, even when
eye movements were controlled for, the
effect of attention in IPS was robust. In
contrast to the effect of attention, the
effect of memory was evident in more
ventral aspects of parietal cortex, mostly
in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), with
greater activation for true memories than
false memories. It is worth emphasizing
that the contrast of true versus false
memories involved a comparison of
trials on which subjects made identical
behavioral responses—claiming to recog-
nize an item as having been previously
studied. Thus, this comparison isolates
differences in memory veridicality, not
behavioral responding. Follow-up anal-
yses indicated that not only was a posi-
tive effect of attention absent in IPL, it
was in fact reversed, with IPL exhibiting
lower activation when attention demands
were high than when attention demands
were low.
The findings of Guerin et al. (2012) build
on prior evidence that memory can
powerfully bias attention (Summerfield
et al., 2006; Chun, 2000), indicating that
the dorsal attention network is more
heavily recruited when multiple stimuli in
the environment are under consideration
as potential matches with items stored inlsevier Inc.memory. It seems likely that this top
down attention was allocated to the
external perceptual stimuli, but another
possibility is that the dorsal attention
network can be oriented toward internal
representations such as memories (Ca-
beza et al., 2008). While the study by Gue-
rin and colleagues could not directly test
this idea, recent studies suggest that
distinct aspects of dorsal parietal cortex
are modulated by visuospatial attention
and episodic memory (Hutchinson et al.,
2009, Sestieri et al., 2010). Thus, while it
remains to be seen whether there is an
analogous dorsal/ventral organization in
lateral parietal cortex across memory
and visuospatial attention, there does
not appear to be perfect overlap in the
specific parietal regions that govern each.
While visuospatial attention is expected
to play a role in a memory task that
involves fine-grained perceptual discrimi-
nations, it is surprising that this recruit-
ment of top down attention was disso-
ciable from memory outcomes. Namely,
activity in IPS did not differ as a function
of whether subjects correctly recognized
targets or falsely recognized related
items. Of course, this result does not indi-
cate that IPS played no role in memory
success—top-down attention to candi-
date pictures was presumably a prerequi-
site for successful decisions—rather, it
suggests that top down attention may
have been effectively deployed both
when memory succeeded (true memo-
ries) and when it failed (false memories).
What, then, determined whether a true
memory or false memory would be
produced? In large part, it was the pres-
ence or absence of the target that deter-
mined the outcome: when the target was
present subjects exhibited sufficiently
detailed memory to reliably select the
target over the related picture. But when
the target was absent, false memories
were common. Critically, these different
outcomes were robustly related to activity
in IPL—not IPS—indicating that IPL
tracked the veridicality of memory. One
interesting question not addressed by
Guerin et al. (2012) is whether IPL activity
would predict memory outcomes when
only considering situations where the
target was absent. In other words, while
false memories were more likely to occur
when the target was absent, there were
also cases where subjects successfully
Neuron
Previewsrejected two related items to (correctly)
indicate that the target was absent. Was
this because the target was retrieved
from memory with sufficient perceptual
detail to suppress a false memory? If so,
would this situation also be characterized
by greater IPL activation as compared to
when a false memory occurred?
Together, the findings of Guerin et al.
(2012) suggest that top-down attention
and memory retrieval do not always go
hand in hand. Indeed, their findings sug-
gest that these processes may compete:
when attention demands were high, IPL
activity actually decreased. To the extent
that IPL activity reflected processes
related to memory or internal thoughts,
the reduction in IPL activity during situa-
tions of high attention may reflect an an-
tagonistic relationship between memory
and attention. It remains to be seen
whether this reflects a tradeoff between
orienting to the external environment
versus internal representations (Chun
et al., 2011) or amore generalizable disso-
ciation between attention and memory.
In summary, the findings of Guerin and
colleagues provide a compelling charac-
terization of how distinct aspects of lateral
parietal cortex contribute to situations in
which we must carefully compare the
present with the past. These findings are
relevant to a very active debate concern-
ing the role of lateral parietal cortex in
memory (for reviews, see Cabeza et al.,2008; Shimamura, 2011; Wagner et al.,
2005). Additionally, the study makes an
important contribution to our understand-
ing of memory failures (Johnson, 1997;
Schacter, 1999), highlighting both the
situations in which false memories are
likely to occur and the neural responses
that are associated with these lapses. An
interesting question for future work is
how necessary the contributions of lateral
parietal cortex are to successful episodic
remembering. While damage to lateral
parietal cortex has not been associated
with robust memory deficits—clearly not
to the degree that occurs with damage
to the medial temporal lobe system—it
is possible that lateral parietal regions
make subtle but meaningful contributions
to memory. This could be addressed by
carefully probing memory functioning in
neglect patients with parietal damage.
For example, in the paradigm employed
by Guerin et al. (2012), perhaps damage
to IPS would impair the initial step of allo-
cating attention to candidate pictures.
Damage to IPL, on the other hand, may
result in a diminished ability to make
subtle discriminations between targets
and related (but new) items. Both neu-
roimaging and patient work can further
characterize the competitive interactions
between IPL and IPS in tasks that care-
fully and cleverly separate attentional
demands andmemory success as Gueirin
and colleagues have done.Neuron 75, SeREFERENCES
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